For a manager-run U.S. Bruster’s store, the modeled range runs from an operating loss of about $22,000 to pre-tax owner earnings of about $120,000 per year. An active owner replacing the paid manager has an estimated owner-operator benefit of about $53,000 to $195,000, but that higher figure includes compensation for the owner’s full-time labor and is not passive business profit.
This range is an independent analytical scenario, not an Item 19 financial performance representation by Bruster’s Limited Partnership. It combines identified facts from the 2026 FDD with an IRS restaurant expense benchmark, a BLS manager-wage benchmark, and explicit margin sensitivities. Actual results can differ materially because of location, free-standing versus end-cap format, sales, labor, occupancy, financing, owner involvement, seasonality, and execution.
Legal franchisor: Bruster’s Limited Partnership. FDD issuance date: April 24, 2026. Item 19 status: official Average Unit Volume and cost-of-goods data, but no store profit, EBITDA, net income, cash flow, owner compensation, or owner earnings. Formats: free-standing and end-cap stores; Item 19 combines eligible franchised stores rather than separating those formats. Benchmark sources: IRS 2023 nonfarm sole-proprietorship restaurant income statements and BLS May 2025 food service manager wages. Checked: July 19, 2026. See the official U.S. Bruster’s franchise website for the current franchise offering context.
What does the 2026 Bruster’s Item 19 actually report?
Item 19 officially reports revenue and distributor-based cost of goods for eligible franchised stores; it does not report owner earnings. For calendar year 2025, 183 of 219 franchised locations operated a standard seven-day schedule for at least 358 days and entered the Average Unit Volume cohort.
The strongest central revenue observations are the $685,840 median AUV and $746,650 overall AUV. Median and average are not interchangeable: the median is the middle store, while the overall AUV can be pulled upward by higher-volume locations. The FDD also reports a $2,421,735 highest AUV and a $157,586 lowest AUV, but those extremes are not used as the earnings scenarios.
Middle eligible franchised store by Gross Sales.
Average Gross Sales for the eligible cohort.
Distributor inventory cost divided by Gross Sales.
5% royalty plus 3% Marketing Fund contribution.
84% of franchised locations met the 358-day test.
| 2025 FDD revenue band | Stores | Share of 219 stores | Average Unit Volume |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bottom-Range AUV | 61 | 27.7% | $449,474 |
| Mid-Range AUV | 61 | 27.7% | $693,606 |
| Top-Range AUV | 61 | 27.7% | $1,096,870 |
Source: 2026 Bruster’s FDD, Item 19, pp. 51–54. The FDD calls these Top-Range, Mid-Range, and Bottom-Range AUV groups; they are revenue observations, not profit bands or probabilities. The 36 franchised stores outside the 2025 AUV cohort did not meet the disclosed 358-day eligibility test.
The 2025 median AUV of $685,840 is Gross Sales. Item 19 expressly says owners still bear significant royalty, marketing, occupancy, labor, insurance, maintenance, professional-service, debt-service, and owner-compensation costs. The FTC’s franchise buyer guide likewise cautions that gross sales do not reveal actual costs or profit.
How is the Bruster’s owner-earnings range calculated?
The estimate starts with Bruster’s official 2025 revenue bands and median cost of goods, then adapts a government restaurant income-statement benchmark. The result is a pre-tax, pre-debt operating estimate rather than an FDD-reported profit figure.
The IRS 2023 sole-proprietorship row for “Restaurants (full & limited service) and drinking places” reports business receipts, deductions, depreciation, interest, advertising, cost of sales, and net income. That category is broader than an ice cream store. The Census Bureau classifies ice cream parlors under NAICS 722515, Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars, but a comparably detailed official profit statement for that narrow category was not available for this model.
Percentage-point bridge from the broad IRS restaurant benchmark to the Bruster’s base owner-operator margin.
Interpretation: the base 14.8% is a derived owner-operator operating margin before interest, depreciation, financing principal, capital expenditures, and personal taxes. It is not a reported Bruster’s margin.
Sources and formula: IRS Statistics of Income, 2023 Table 2; 2026 Bruster’s FDD, Item 6, pp. 7–10 and Item 19, pp. 53–54. IRS values used at full precision: 3.38% net income less deficit, 37.51% cost of sales and operations, 1.22% advertising, 3.00% depreciation, and 0.84% business interest. Bruster’s inputs: 23.20% median cost of goods, 5% royalty, and 3% Marketing Fund contribution.
- Cost-of-goods adjustment: the model replaces the IRS restaurant cost-of-sales ratio with Bruster’s official 2025 median cost of goods. Bruster’s defines this measure from distributor inventory orders, so it may not capture every direct cost an accountant would include in cost of sales.
- Marketing treatment: the IRS benchmark already contains 1.22% advertising expense. The bridge subtracts only the incremental difference to Bruster’s required 3% Marketing Fund contribution. The optional 3%–5% local-store marketing encouraged by Item 6 is not included.
- Royalty treatment: the full 5% royalty is deducted explicitly. The IRS “other business expenses” line may include some franchise fees for some taxpayers, but the dataset does not isolate them; this possible overlap is a material uncertainty.
- Other operating expenses: the IRS benchmark continues to embed its broad restaurant ratios for wages, rent, utilities, insurance, repairs, taxes, supplies, professional services, and other deductions because Item 19 does not disclose comparable Bruster’s ratios.
- Scenario spread: Conservative, Base, and Upside use 11.8%, 14.8%, and 17.8% owner-operator margins. The ±3 percentage-point sensitivity is an editorial assumption, not an FDD distribution or probability forecast.
The IRS nonfarm sole-proprietorship statistics cover Schedule C businesses and are broader than Bruster’s. This breadth is the principal reason the evidence confidence is Limited.
What do Conservative, Base, and Upside earnings look like?
The scenarios produce a manager-run range from approximately -$22,000 to $120,000 and an owner-operator benefit range from approximately $53,000 to $195,000. The Base scenario is about $27,000 of manager-run pre-tax owner earnings or $102,000 of owner-operator benefit.
| Scenario and FDD revenue anchor | Owner-operator margin | Owner-operator benefit | Manager-run owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Conservative Bottom-Range AUV: $449,474 |
11.8% | $53,000 | -$22,000 |
|
Base Mid-Range AUV: $693,606 |
14.8% | $102,000 | $27,000 |
|
Upside Top-Range AUV: $1,096,870 |
17.8% | $195,000 | $120,000 |
The Base scenario is an analytical center point, not a forecast of the most likely outcome.
Annual dollars per store; owner-operator benefit includes the value of replacing a paid food service manager.
Interpretation: replacing a paid manager adds about $74,880 of labor value in every scenario. That amount compensates the owner for work; it is not an increase in passive unit profit.
Sources: revenue anchors from 2026 Bruster’s FDD, Item 19, p. 51; manager wage from the BLS May 2025 national wage table. Earnings are rounded to the nearest $1,000 after calculations using full-precision inputs.
The $74,880 BLS figure is the national annual mean wage for food service managers across industries. It excludes employer payroll taxes and benefits, so the manager-run estimates may be optimistic where a full compensation package costs more. Local manager pay can also differ substantially from the national mean.
Can a Bruster’s owner treat the store as passive income?
No passive-income conclusion is supported. Item 15 requires the franchisee, an Operating Owner, or approved Management Personnel with primary responsibility to devote full time, energy, and best efforts to managing and operating the business. The store must be managed at all times by an owner, Operating Owner, trained Store Manager, or other trained manager.
A manager-run structure is therefore contemplated, but it still requires approved, trained, accountable management. The FDD also states that an Operating Owner generally must hold at least 25% of the franchisee entity unless the franchisor approves a smaller interest. The official Bruster’s fact sheet describes free-standing and end-cap formats, but the FDD does not provide separate profit data for either format or for owner-operated versus manager-run stores.
Source: 2026 Bruster’s FDD, Item 15, pp. 41–42.
Which variables can move annual earnings the most?
Sales volume, labor, occupancy, and owner involvement are the largest modeled drivers. The range is especially sensitive because Item 19 combines free-standing and end-cap stores and does not disclose operating profit, labor ratios, rent ratios, or separate performance by format.
- Sales and seasonality: the FDD’s bottom-, mid-, and top-range AUVs are materially different. Weather, operating days, local demand, pricing, delivery, and product mix can change both revenue and cost of goods.
- Labor: the owner’s decision to manage the store directly versus hire a trained manager changes modeled cash by roughly $75,000 before manager payroll burden. Hourly staffing efficiency remains separate and is not disclosed by Item 19.
- Occupancy and format: a free-standing site and an end-cap lease have different real-estate economics. Item 19 does not isolate sales or earnings by format, and the model does not assume that one format is superior.
- Marketing: the model includes the required 3% Marketing Fund contribution but not the additional 3%–5% local-store marketing that Item 6 encourages. Choosing that extra spend would reduce current cash unless it produces compensating sales.
- Financing and capital reserves: Item 10 states that the franchisor does not offer or guarantee financing. Loan interest, principal, equipment replacement, remodeling, and maintenance reserves can reduce owner cash materially and are not standardized here.
- Cohort selection: Item 19 included 183 of 219 franchised stores. The remaining 36 did not meet the 358-day threshold, so the disclosed AUV cohort is not the entire system population.
Bruster’s reports one affiliate-owned store with 2025 AUV of $1,170,936 and cost of goods of 29.8%. That single store is not used in this model because its ownership differs from the franchised cohort and a sample of one cannot establish typical company-operated economics.
Item 20 reported 219 franchised outlets at December 31, 2025, up from 205 a year earlier. During 2025, 18 franchised outlets opened and four ceased operations for other reasons; Item 20 reported no terminations, non-renewals, or franchisor reacquisitions. Those counts provide system context, not proof of profitability. Source: 2026 Bruster’s FDD, Item 20, pp. 55–59.
What should a buyer verify before relying on this range?
A buyer should rebuild the estimate with location-specific records and direct franchisee evidence. The FTC says prospective franchisees may request written substantiation for Item 19 claims, and the Bruster’s FDD says that substantiation will be made available upon reasonable request.
- Ask for Item 19 substantiation: confirm how Gross Sales, operating days, distributor orders, refunds, delivery sales, and excluded stores were handled.
- Separate format economics: obtain actual free-standing and end-cap rent, utility, maintenance, drive-thru, patio, and capital-reserve data rather than using a blended system result.
- Interview comparable franchisees: ask owners with similar climates, sales bands, store ages, and owner roles for labor, occupancy, local marketing, insurance, repair, and manager-compensation ratios. Item 20 states that no franchisees had confidentiality clauses in the prior three years restricting open discussion of their experience.
- Reconcile owner compensation: determine whether an owner’s salary, draw, guaranteed payment, distribution, and retained earnings are included or excluded in every number provided.
- Model debt separately: use the actual financed amount, rate, term, collateral, and amortization schedule. Do not subtract the Item 7 startup investment from one year of sales.
- Confirm current fees and amendments: verify the 5% royalty, 3% Marketing Fund contribution, technology-vendor costs, any future technology fee, required local programs, and state-specific addenda before signing.
What is the strongest defensible earnings range?
The strongest defensible range from the available evidence is approximately -$22,000 to $120,000 of annual manager-run pre-tax owner earnings, or approximately $53,000 to $195,000 of annual owner-operator benefit when the owner replaces a paid manager. These are scenario-based estimates, not official Bruster’s profit results.
The most important earnings driver is the combination of store sales and paid-management cost. The largest unresolved uncertainty is the absence of same-brand labor, occupancy, and operating-profit data separated by free-standing versus end-cap format. Before deciding, a buyer should verify the 2026 Item 19 substantiation, build a location-specific operating statement, and interview current and former franchisees whose stores match the proposed format, climate, maturity, sales band, and owner role.
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